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Income-tax Department
Edited by Stephen G. Rusk.

The district court of the United States, southern district of Ohio, has
made an interesting decision with respect to the features that must be
present in the business transacted by building and loan associations if they
are to be exempt from the provisions of the revenue act of 1918. To
those familiar with the law and regulations relating to exempt associa
tions of this kind it is difficult to understand why a suit should be brought
to establish itself as exempt by a building and loan association that has
“as its chief business dealing for profit with the general public by the
methods of an ordinary savings bank.” The court for this reason among
others held that the Lilley Building & Loan Co. was not entitled to ex
emption from income taxes.
Stock subscription rights are dealt with in a comprehensive manner
by the supreme court of the United States in the case of Miles, Collector,
versus Safe Deposit & Trust Company, Guardian. The questions as to
rights and responsibilities of taxpayers owning or dealing in such rights
to stock may be considered as definitely answered by this decision.
A decision of importance is that (No. 3367) which amends article 836
of regulations 62. The amending language sets forth quite definitely the
proof required by the department of internal revenue of corporations
which seek to include in invested capital “tangible property paid in; value
in excess of par value of stock.” The limitations as to appraisals as proof
will be better understood as a result of this amendment of article 836.
There are many corporations that are unquestionably entitled to include
in invested capital such tangible property, but have found it difficult to
furnish proof of the fact because of lack of knowledge as to what would
be accepted as proof. It is probable that the text of this article will be
amplified further when the taxing officers obtain more experience by
handling concrete cases of the kind involved by the section of the revenue
acts dealing with this difficult question.
TREASURY RULINGS
(T. D. 3355, June 17, 1922.)

Income tax—Revenue act of 1918—Decision of court.
1. Exemptions—Building and Loan Associations—Essential Char
acteristics.
Mutuality is the essential principle of a building and loan
association. Its object is to raise a fund to be loaned among its mem
bers or such as may desire to avail themselves of the privilege. Its
business is confined to its members.
2. Building and Loan Associations—Exemption from Tax.
When a building and loan association ceases to be substantially mu
tual and adopts as its chief business dealing for profit with the general
public by the methods of an ordinary savings bank, it is no longer en
titled to exemption under section 231, paragraph 4, of the revenue act of
1918.
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3. Same—Incidental Transactions.
The making of loans to nonmembers or borrowing from nonmembers
does not defeat exemption under section 231, paragraph 4, of the
revenue act of 1918, if such transactions are simply incidental to the
primary business of operating a building and loan association.
The appended decision of the United States district court, southern
district of Ohio, eastern division, in the case of the Lilley Building &
Loan Co. v. Newton M. Miller, collector, is published for the information
of internal revenue officers and others.
District Court

of the United States, Southern
Eastern Division, No. 2105.

District of Ohio,

The Lilley Building & Loan Company, plaintiff, v. Newton M. Miller, as
Collector of Internal Revenue, etc., defendant.
'Peck, district judge: Action to recover corporate income taxes paid
under protest for the years 1918, 1919, and 1920, under the revenue act of
1918. Submitted on the evidence, without jury.
The essential question is whether the plaintiff was exempt from the
tax. Section 231 (4) exempts “domestic building and loan associations
and cooperative banks without capital stock, organized and operated for
mutual purposes and without profit.” It is claimed by the government
that the plaintiff does a banking business under the guise of a building
association; by the defendant, that its activities are no broader than those
permitted to be exercised by such associations organized under the laws
of Ohio. General Code Ohio, 9643, et seq.
The facts are not in dispute. Plaintiff does not hold meetings at
stated intervals, as such associations frequently do, but keeps its place of
business open during the usual business hours of the day.
It receives deposits from nonmembers, evidenced by entries in books
such as are ordinarily used by savings banks. Withdrawals may be made
on presentation of books. On these accounts (which constitute the bulk
of its business) it pays interest at the stated rate of 4 per cent. It also
receives time deposits, for which it issues certificates bearing interest at
the rate of 5 per cent. It has paid-up stock, also “running stock,” on
which instalment payments are made. Both classes of stock receive
semiannual dividends at the rate of 5 per cent per annum. Its statement
for the year 1920, which may be taken as typical of the period of time
involved, shows running stock at $121,000; paid-up stock at $123,000;
deposits of $830,000; borrowed money, $20,000; and a reserve fund of
$18,500 (odd figures are omitted). Its stockholders numbered 301; its
borrowers 495, of whom but two were stockholders; and its savings de
positors were 2,239. Its loans were all made upon homes, the average
amount of each being about $3,500. It had no checking accounts. A
depositor wishing to make a withdrawal presented his passbook and for
the amount was given a check to his own order, which he indorsed and
returned to the association, receiving thereon the cash. The association
then put the check through its bank. Its mortgage loans were usually pay
able in monthly instalments. The few loans made to members took the
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same course as those to nonmembers. The borrowing members gave their
notes and paid them off in instalments, such obligations being entirely
disassociated from their obligations to pay for stock. The ordinary build
ing association method of subscribing for stock to the amount of the
loan, the stock when paid up extinguishing the loan, was not pursued.
It will be observed that about 80 per cent of its receipts and 97 per
cent of its loans are transactions with nonmembers. Thus, by far the
greater number of those with whom it does business have no interest in
its profits, and as long as it remains solvent they have none in its losses.
The earnings accrue to the stockholders. Mutuality of interest between
stockholders, on the one hand, and the depositors and borrowers, on the
other, is lacking.
This course of business seems to be within its charter powers as pre
scribed by the statutes of Ohio, particularly sections 9648 and 9657, Gen
eral Code of Ohio. It does not, however, conform to the general con
ception of the functions of such an association. “Mutuality is the essen
tial principle of a building association. Its business is confined to its own
members; its object being to raise a fund to be loaned among themselves,
or such as may desire to avail themselves of the privilege.” Eversmann
v. Schmitt (53 O. S. 175, 184). “The leading feature of such an asso
ciation is that its members are kept upon a strictly co-operative basis with
mutual advantages and benefits, sharing alike in the profits and sustaining
their proportionate share of the losses.” 4 R. C. L. Building and Loan
Associations (p. 344). In Halsell v. Merchants Insurance Co. (105 Miss.
268) a concern organized under the building association act of the state
of Mississippi, with powers similar to those exercised by the plaintiff, was
held not to be such an association in the real meaning of the term. Having
regard, therefore, to its general character as distinguished from its mere
charter powers, there is no doubt that the business conducted was in the
main not that of a building association as ordinarily conceived.
Plaintiff’s counsel, however, contend that the definition adopted by the
statutes of Ohio of the term “building association,” and not that of general
usage, is controlling. But it must be remarked that the statutes referred
to do not attempt to define a “building association” as distinguished from
a “savings association.” “A corporation for the purpose of raising money
to be loaned to its members shall be known * * * as a ‘building and
loan association’ or as a ‘savings association.’ ” G. C. 9643. The statutes
carry the distinction no further. Both are treated alike. The same
powers are conferred on each. Such a corporation may combine both
phrases or parts thereof in its name. It may as truly be said that the
corporation is designated as “savings association” as a “building associa
tion” by the laws of Ohio. Plaintiff has named itself a “building associa
tion.” It might have named itself a “savings association.” Its powers,
liabilities, structure, character and place in the law would have been the
same. It may even now change its name to a “building association.”
Would it be exempt as a “savings association”? If not, would it secure
exemptions by such change of name, its character remaining precisely the
same?
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It is pointed out that the revenue acts of 1909 and 1913 exempted
domestic building and loan associations “organized and operated exclu
sively for the mutual benefit of their members”; that these qualifying
words were omitted in the act of 1918, that they were restored in the
act of 1921 in this phraseology: “* * * domestic building and loan
associations substantially all the business of which is confined to making
loans to members,” and it is argued that the omission of such language in
the 1918 statute indicates a purpose of congress to exempt all corporations
organized as domestic building associations under the laws of the several
states, without any condition or qualification whatsoever; that congress
took them with their charter powers and their activities as they existed,
and exempted them from the tax; and it is further insisted that the inten
tion of congress to tax them must clearly appear, and that they are not
to be taxed by implication. Gould v. Gould (245 U. S. 151). But did
congress omit the qualifying language in the act of 1918?
Having resort to the text of the act itself, it is to be noticed that the
exception concludes with the words “organized and operated for mutual
purposes and without profit.” In Holmes Federal Taxes, 1922 edition,
page 318, the author puts a comma before this clause, indicating an inter
pretation that would make these words modify not only cooperative banks
but building associations. While the comma is not found in the act, and
the usual presumption is that a phrase modifies its immediate antecedent,
yet there is good reason for taking these words as referring to both ante
cedents. By so doing, the act is in conformity with the general policy of
the acts of 1909, 1913 and 1921. Furthermore, there seems to be just as
much reason for requiring that building associations, to be exempt, must
be organized and operated for mutual purposes and without profit, as
there is for applying that requirement to cooperative banks. Plaintiff’s
interpretation is that corporations organized under building association
laws are exempt, although operated not for mutual purposes and with a
profit to a limited number of stockholders, be they ever so few. Such an
interpretation would seem to violate the intent of the act. Recurring to
the matter of nomenclature under the Ohio statutes, if we regard the
plaintiff as a “savings association” we would have a mutual bank, with
capital stock, not organized and operated for mutual purposes and not
without profit. The matter certainly can not rest so lightly as on the
arbitrary choice of a name. The facts must control. But if it be lin
guistically inaccurate to take the adjective phrase in question as modify
ing “building associations,” nevertheless the rule of nescitur a sociis, which,
in this instance, it seems proper to apply, would lead to the same inter
pretation.
It is not thought that the making of loans to nonmembers, or borrow
ing from nonmembers, or receiving deposits to be withdrawn on demand
or on time, so long as such transactions are simply incidental to the pri
mary business of operating a mutual building association, would defeat the
exemption. In Central Building Loan & Savings Co. v. Bowland (216
Fed. 526) the question was whether the existence of such powers neces
sarily put the corporation out of the exempt class, and it was concluded
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that it did not, and that conclusion is thoroughly concurred in. But here
the association has put aside the attribute of mutuality; indeed, it is most
difficult to distinguish its activities from those of the ordinary savings
bank. Its primary design no longer is to be an instrumentality of mutual
helpfulness among its contributors in saving and borrowing for home own
ing, but its object now is the receiving of deposits from and lending money
on interest to the public for the profit of the stockholders. Counsel argue
that the people are better served thus; that mutuality is inefficient; that a
concern of 10 stockholders and many customers is more beneficial to the
public than one containing in its body corporate all of its depositors and
borrowers. This may be true. But the statute has not exempted all cor
porations that receive deposits and loan money on homes.
It may not be possible to define precisely how far a building association
may go in extraneous activities without losing its essential character, but
it seems clear that when it ceases to be substantially mutual and adopts
as its chief business dealing for profit with the general public by the methods
of an ordinary savings bank, it is no longer a building association en
titled to be exempted from income taxation under the statute in question.
It is therefore concluded that the petition must be dismissed.
(T. D. 3365, July 6, 1922.)
Income Taxes—Act of February 24, 1919—Decision of Supreme Court.
1. Stock Subscription Rights—Nature—Income.
A stockholder’s privilege of subscribing to new shares of stock before
they are offered to the public is an incident of his stock ownership, and
the acquisition of that privilege, while it may increase the value of the
stockholder’s interest in the corporation, does not constitute a segrega
tion of the profits of the corporation, and is not gain, profit, or income
to the stockholder.
2. Same—Sale of Rights—Extent of Tax Liability.
A stockholder of a corporation who receives the right to subscribe for
shares of a new issue of stock is, on sale of such right, liable to income
tax on so much of the proceeds as exceeds the cost of the right (citing
Merchants Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka, T. D. 3173).
3. Same—Sale of Rights—Computation of Gain.
The new shares, if and when issued, are indistinguishable from the
old shares, and as they are received by reason of the ownership of the
old shares, the average of the price paid for the old shares and of the
subscribing price for the new shares constitutes cost for either an old
share or a new share in computing taxable gain, following the analogy
of the computation employed in the case of the sale of stock dividend
shares. On the sale of stock rights, cost and selling price are de
termined by assuming that the stockholder, instead of selling his rights,
subscribed for new shares and sold them, and the gain taxable to a
stockholder who sells his rights is equal to the gain taxable to a stock
holder who subscribes for a new share and sells his new share. In
ascertaining the selling price it is assumed that the stockholder, if he
had subscribed, would have refused to sell his new share for any amount
less than the sum of the subscribing figure and the prevailing price

210

Income-tax Department
offered for the rights, and the sum of these two amounts is assumed
to represent the selling price of the stock rights. The taxable gain,
therefore, is found by taking the sum of the subscribing price and the
market value of the rights, and subtracting from that sum the average
of (1) the cost of one old share, and (2) the subscribing price of one
new share.
4. Stock Subscription Rights—Sale of Rights—Computation of Gain.
The acquisition of a new share by the exercise of a right to subscribe
is merely an exercise of one of the rights of stock ownership, arid until
the new share has been sold, no profit has been realized, and there is no
taxable income.
Supreme Court of the United States. No. 416. October Term, 1921.
Joshua W. Miles, collector of internal revenue for the district of Maryland,
plaintiff in error, v. Safe Deposit and Trust Co. of Baltimore,
guardian of Frank R. Brown.
Error to the district court of the United States for the district of Maryland.
[May 29, 1922.]
Mr. Justice Pitney delivered the opinion of the court:
Defendant in error, a corporation organized under the laws of Maryland
and authorized to act as guardian, was on January 30, 1919, appointed by the
orphans court guardian of Frank R. Brown, an infant whose father had died
intestate about a year before. The son as next of kin became entitled to
35 shares of the stock of the Hartford Fire Insurance Co., and they were
transferred to defendant in error as such guardian, and still are held by it in
that capacity. At that time the capital stock of the insurance company issued
and outstanding consisted of 20,000 shares of the par value of $100 each.
Later in the year that company, under statutory authority, increased its
capital stock to 40,000 shares of the same par value. The resolution of the
stockholders sanctioning the increase provided that the right to subscribe to
the new issue should be offered to the stockholders at the price of $150 per
share, in the proportion of one share of new stock to each share of stock
held by them; subscriptions to be payable in instalments and the directors to
have power to dispose of shares not so subscribed and paid for in such
manner as they might determine to be for the best interests of the company.
In July, 1919, defendant in error, pursuant to an order of the orphans
court, sold the subscription right to 35 shares owned by its ward for
$12,546.80, equivalent to $358.48 per share. The commissioner of internal
revenue, holding that this entire amount was income for the year, under the
provisions of the act approved February 24, 1919 (ch. 18, 40 Stat. 1057),
assessed and plaintiff in error collected a tax amounting to $1,130.77 by
reason of it. Defendant in error, having paid this under protest and
unavailingly appealed to the commissioner, claiming that none of the amount
so received was income within the meaning either of the act or of the
sixteenth amendment, brought this action against the collector to recover
the entire amount of tax so assessed and paid. The case was tried before
the district court without a jury on stipulated facts and evidence. Plaintiff’s
extreme contention that the subscription right to new stock and also the
proceeds of the sale of the right were wholly capital and not in any part
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subject to be taxed as income, was overruled upon the authority of Mer
chants’ Loan & Trust Co. v. Smietanka (255 U. S. 509), then recently
decided. The trial court, in the second place, held that, of the proceeds of
the sale of the subscription rights, so much only as represented a realized
profit over and above the cost to plaintiff of what was sold was taxable as
income. In order to compute the amount of the profit, the court commenced
with the value of the old shares prior to authorization of the stock increase,
which upon the basis of evidence contained in the stipulation was taken to be
what they were assessed at by the United States for purposes of the estate
tax at the death of the ward’s father, viz., $710 per share, and added the
$150 necessary to be paid by a stockholder or his assignee in order to obtain
a share of the new stock, making the cost of two shares (1 old and 1 new)
$860 and half of this the cost of one share.
The sale of the subscription rights at $358.48, the purchaser to pay the
issuing company $150 per share, was treated as equivalent to a sale of the
fully paid shares at $508.48 each, or $78.48 in excess of the $430 which
represented their cost to plaintiff; and this difference multiplied by 35, the
number of shares or rights sold, yielded $2,746.80 as the gain realized out of
the entire transaction. Upon this the court held plaintiff to have been
properly taxable, and upon nothing more, no income tax being assessable
with respect to the 35 shares still retained, because although they were con
sidered worth more, ex-rights, than the $430 per share found to be their
cost, the difference could not be regarded as a taxable profit unless or until
realized by actual sale (273 Fed. 822). To review the final judgment
entered pursuant to the findings and opinion, which sustained only in part
plaintiff’s demand for a refund of the tax paid, the collector of internal
revenue prosecuted a direct writ of error from this court under section 238,
Judicial Code, because of the constitutional questions involved.
There is but one assignment of error, based upon a single exception, which
denied that plaintiff was entitled to recover anything whatever; hence the
correctness of the particular recovery awarded is not in form raised; but
the trial judge, having the complete facts before him, almost of necessity
passed upon them in their entirety in order to determine, according to
truth and substance, how much of what plaintiff received was, and how
much was not, income in the proper sense, as is proper in a case involving
the application of the sixteenth amendment (Eisner v. Macomber (252
U. S. 189, 206) ; United States v. Phellis (Nov. 21, 1921, 257 U. S.—) ;
and in order to review the judgment, it will be proper for us to analyze the
reasoning upon which it was based.
It is not in dispute that the Hartford Fire Insurance Co. is a corporation
of the state of Connecticut and that the stock increase in question was made
under authority of certain acts of the legislature and certain resolutions of
the stockholders, by which the right to subscribe to the new issue was
offered to existing stockholders upon the terms mentioned. It is evident, we
think, that such a distribution in and of itself constituted no division of any
part of the accumulated profits or surplus of the company, or even of its
capital; it was in effect an opportunity given to stockholders to share in
contributing additional capital, not to participate in distribution. It was a
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recognition by the company that the condition of its affairs warranted an
increase of its capital stock to double the par value of that already out
standing, and that the new stock would have a value to the recipients in
excess of $150 per share; a determination that it should be issued pro rata
to the existing stockholders, or so many of them as would pay that price.
This privilege of itself was not a fruit of stock ownership in the nature of a
profit; nor was it a division of any part of the assets of the company.
The right to subscribe to the new stock was but a right to participate, in
preference to strangers and on equal terms with other existing stockholders,
in the privilege of contributing new capital called for by the corporation—
an equity that inheres in stock ownership under such circumstances as a
quality inseparable from the capital interest represented by the old stock,
recognized so universally as to have become axiomatic in American corpora
tion law.—Gray v. Portland Bank (3 Mass. 364) ; Atkyns v. Albree (12
Allen 359, 361); Jones v. Morrison (31 Minn. 140, 152-153); Eidman v.
Bowman (58 Ill. 444, 447) ; Humboldt Driving Park Ass’n v. Stevens, (34
Neb. 528, 534) ; Electric Co. v. Electric Co. (200 Pa. 516, 520-523, 526) ;
Wall v. Utah Copper Co. (70 N. J. Eq. 17, 28 et seq.) ; Stokes v. Continental
Trust Co. (186 N. Y. 285). Evidently this inherent equity was recognized
in the statute and the resolution under which the new stock here in question
was offered and issued.
The stockholder’s right to take his part of the new shares therefore—
assuming their intrinsic value to have exceeded the issuing price—was essen
tially analogous to a stock dividend. So far as the issuing price was con
cerned, payment of this was a condition precedent to participation, coupled
with an opportunity to increase his capital investment. In either aspect, or
both, the subscription right of itself constituted no gain, profit, or income
taxable without apportionment under the sixteenth amendment. Eisner v.
Macomber (252 U. S. 189) is conclusive to this effect.
But in that case it was recognized (p. 212) that a gain through sale of
dividend stock at a profit was taxable as income, the same as a gain derived
through sale of some of the original shares would be. In that as in other
recent cases this court has interpreted “income” as including gains and
profits derived through sale or conversion of capital assets, whether done by
a dealer or trader, or casually by a nontrader, as by a trustee in the course
of changing investments.—Merchants’ Loan & Trust Company v. Smietanka
(255 U. S. 509, 517-520.)
Hence the district court rightly held defendant in error liable to income
tax as to so much of the proceeds of sale of the subscription rights as repre
sented a realized profit over and above the cost to it of what was sold. How
the gain should be computed is a matter of some contention by the govern
ment in this court; but it admits of little doubt. To treat the stockholder’s
right to the new shares as something new and independent of the old, and as
if it actually cost nothing, leaving the entire proceeds of sale as gain, would
ignore the essence of the matter, and the suggestion cannot be accepted.
The district court proceeded correctly in treating the subscription rights as
an increase inseparable from the old shares, not in the way of income but as
capital; in treating the new shares if and when issued as indistinguishable
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legally and in the market sense from the old; and in regarding the sale of
the rights as a sale of a portion of a capital interest that included the old
shares. What would have happened had defendant in error decided to
accept the new shares and pay the issuing price instead of selling the rights
is of no consequence; in that event there would have been no realized profit,
hence no taxable income. What resulted or might have resulted to defendant
in error’s retained interest in the company, depending upon whether the
purchaser exercised his right to subscribe or allowed it to lapse, or whether
in the latter event the stock was sold by the directors is of speculative
interest only. Defendant in error resorted to the market for the sale of a
part of its capital interest, concededly sold at an advance over cost, and
what the profit actually was is the sole concern here; not whether it might
have been more or less, nor whether the purchaser disposed of the stock to
advantage.
That a comparison of the cost at acquisition and the selling price is
proper under section 202 (a) of the act (40 Stat. 1069), where, as here, the
property was acquired and sold within the same taxing year, we understand
to be conceded. Under the stipulation, the court below was warranted in
finding $710 per share to have been the fair market value of the old stock
when turned over to the guardian, and treating this as its cost to the trust.
It was proper to add to this the $150 required to be paid to the company
and treat the total as the cost to plaintiff of each two shares one of which
was to pass to the purchaser. This in essence is the method adopted by the
treasury department in the case of a sale of dividend stock, in regulations
No. 45 (1920 ed., art. 1547), which reads:
Art. 1547. Sale of stock received as dividend.—Stock in a corporation
received as a dividend does not constitute taxable income to a stockholder
in such corporation, but any profit derived by the stockholder from the sale
of such stock is taxable income to him. [Following Eisner v. Macomber,
supra.] For the purpose of ascertaining the gain or loss derived from the
sale of such stock, or from the sale of the stock with respect to which it is
issued, the cost (used to include also, where required, the fair market value
as of March 1, 1913), of both the old and new shares is to be determined
in accordance with the following rules:
“(1) Where the stock issued as a dividend is all of substantially the
same character or preference as the stock upon which the stock dividend is
paid, the cost of each share of both the old and new stock will be the
quotient of the cost, or fair market value as of March 1, 1913, if acquired
prior to that date, of the old shares of stock divided by the total number of
the old and new shares. * * *”
That the averaging of cost might present more administrative difficulty
in a case more complicated than the present, as where the old shares were
acquired at different times, is not a sufficient ground for denying the sound
ness of the method itself.
Various suggestions, more or less ingenious, as to how the profit ought
to be computed, made by counsel for defendant in error and by an amicus
curiae, have been examined and found faulty for reasons unnecessary to be
mentioned. Upon the whole, we are satisfied that the method adopted by
the district court led to a correct result.
Judgment affirmed.
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(T. D. 3367, July 10, 1922)
War excess profits tax.
Article 836, regulation No. 45 (1920 edition), and article 836, regulations
No. 62, amended.
Article 836, regulations No. 45 (1920 edition), and article 836, regula
tions No. 62, are hereby amended to read as follows:
Art. 836. Tangible property paid in; value in excess of par value of
stock.—The paid-in surplus allowed in any case is confined to the value
definitely known or accurately ascertainable at the time the property is paid
in. Evidence offered to support a claim for a paid-in surplus must be as of
the date of the payment. It may consist among other things of (a) an
appraisal of the property by disinterested authorities; (b) a certificate of
the assessed value in the case of real estate, or (c) evidence of a market
price in excess of the par value of the stock or shares. Opinion evidence
expert or otherwise, of the value of property as of a prior date will not be
accepted. Retrospective appraisals submitted in support of a claim for a
paid-in surplus will not be accepted in any case where other reasonably
satisfactory evidence is available and in any case will be accepted only after
rigid scrutiny and will be followed only to the extent to which their reason
ableness is fully established. The property which was paid in is the basis of
the appraisal, and the appraisal must reconcile the accounts so as to reflect
accurately the actual value on the date as of which the appraisal is made
and the depreciation sustained. Proper consideration must in all cases be
given to depreciation and the expired and remaining serviceable life of the
property must be shown. To be acceptable retrospective appraisals must
show: (1) The history of the business and manner in which the informa
tion or data was acquired; (2) the manner in which the appraisals were con
structed; (3) the inventory on the date of the appraisal in detail; (4) the
date of acquisition of all items remaining in the inventory as of the date of
appraisal; (5) the elimination from the inventory of all items acquired
subsequent to the date as of which the appraisal is made and how this was
effected (all items, the date of acquisition of which cannot be definitely
determined, should be listed separately and all the facts bearing upon the
date of acquisition given) ; (6) the replacement cost at the date as of
which the appraisal is made of each item accepted as on hand on that date de
termined upon competent data, with a statement of the method employed in
arriving at such cost (estimates and general statements will not be accepted) ;
(7) the rate and total amount of depreciation as shown by the books; (8)
the rate and total amount of depreciation taken upon each item included in
the appraisal for the purposes of the appraisal (if other than normal rates
of depreciation are used the reason therefor and the method of computing
depreciation must be fully explained) ; (9) the actual cost when ascertain
able of each item included in the appraisal; (10) the book value on the date
as of which the appraisal is made of all the items included in the appraisal;
and (11) a detailed statement of all plant facilities and additions, repre
sented by capital expenditures previously written off, which were still in
use on the date as of which the appraisal was made and all the depreciation
actually sustained or accrued on such items. No claim will be allowed for
paid-in surplus in any case in which the addition of value has been developed
or ascertained subsequent to the date on which the property was paid in to
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the corporation, or in respect of property which the stockholders or their
agents on or shortly before the date of such payment acquired at a bargain
price, as, for instance, at a receiver’s sale. Generally, allowable claims
under this article will arise out of transactions in which there has been no
substantial change of beneficial interest in the property paid in to the corpora
tion, and in all cases the proof of value must be clear and explicit.
Franklin K. Moyer

Franklin K. Moyer, member of the American Institute of Accountants,
certified public accountant of Pennsylvania, died at Souderton, Pennsylvania
on August 12th. Mr. Moyer was a partner of the firm of Moyer & Schect
man, Philadelphia.
Mack E. Stewart

Mack E. Stewart, member of the American Institute of Accountants,
died June 26th as a result of a gasoline explosion. Mr. Stewart had been
a member of the institute since 1920 and was an active member of the
profession in Oklahoma.
Frank H. Walker

Frank H. Walker, member of the American Institute of Accountants, died
August 16, 1922. Funeral services were held at Amherst on August 18th.
Mr. Walker had been associated for many years with the firm of Herbert F.
French & Co. of Boston.
Oklahoma Society of Certified Public Accountants

At a meeting of the Oklahoma Society of Certified Public Accountants,
held June 16, 1922, the following officers were elected: President, Homer C.
Hammonds; treasurer, Mack E. Stewart; secretary, Carl L. Rice; auditors,
Arthur Jones, Mack Porter; trustees, Robert E. Garnett, Hugh M. Rush
and William C. Beck.

Arthur E. Chandler and Howard E. Murray announce the admission to
partnership of Floyd Chilton, under the firm name of Chandler, Murray &
Chilton, with offices at 816-818 Second National building, Akron, Ohio.

William Bryden & Co. announce change in name to Bryden & Fauble
and the removal of their offices to 638 Securities building, Omaha, Nebraska.
Patterson, Teele & Dennis announce the admission of Harold Burton
Hart to partnership as of July 18, 1922.

Seward, Stone & Monde announce the opening of an office in the Aeolian
building, 33 West 42nd street, New York.
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